Introduction
…there is no general theory of mutualism that approaches the explanatory power that 'Hamilton's rule' appears to hold for the understanding of within-species interactions. (Herre et al., 1999) Mutualisms are widespread and ecologically important but, like within-species cooperation, their evolution represents a challenge for evolutionary theory (Herre et al., 1999; Bronstein, 2003; Sachs et al., 2004) . Trivers (1971) showed that mutualism resembles the Prisoner's dilemma, where two players can benefit from cooperation but gain most from cheating their partners. This raises the question of how selection favours cooperation among species rather than cheaters that accept the benefits from their partner species without providing anything in return.
A number of factors have been suggested to explain mutualism (reviewed in Bergstrom et al., 2003; Sachs et al., 2004) . Axelrod & Hamilton (1981) showed that cooperation is favoured in the Prisoner's dilemma when there are repeated interactions and when cooperation is conditional upon the other partner's behaviour. More recently, a spatial version of the prisoner's dilemma has shown that local interactions can produce cooperation among species without conditional behaviour (Doebeli & Knowlton, 1998; Yamamura et al., 2004) . Frank (1994) also emphasized the potential for local interactions to favour mutualism when it generates a genetic correlation between species, which was likened to a form of betweenspecies relatedness. Within-species relatedness has also been shown to promote mutualism (Frank, 1994; West et al., 2002b) .
Other approaches have separated Axelrod and Hamilton's two themes of repeated interactions and conditional responses (Sachs et al., 2004) . First, the idea of repeated interactions has been developed into the notion of partner-fidelity feedback (Bull & Rice, 1991; Sachs et al., 2004) , which argues that cooperation will be favoured when species stay together in stable associations that align their fitness interests. Secondly, conditional responses are central to the idea of partner choice, where one species interacts preferentially with the more cooperative members of the partner species (Bull & Rice, 1991; Noe & Hammerstein, 1994; Johnstone & Bshary, 2002; Sachs et al., 2004) . Similarly, in partner sanctions noncooperative partners are sanctioned and receive less mutualistic aid (West et al., 2002a; Kiers et al., 2003) . Normally sanctions are considered to be enforced by only one party but mutualism is also promoted if both partner species preferentially direct aid to more cooperative members of the other species (Ferriere et al., 2002) . Finally, it has been suggested that there may often simply be no incentive to cheat a mutualism if cooperation carries no energetic cost (Connor, 1986 (Connor, , 1995 Sachs et al., 2004) . Such 'byproduct mutualisms' can easily evolve and it has been suggested that in many mutualisms one of the partners may be largely passive and bear no costs from the interaction (pseudoreciprocity, Connor, 1986) .
Several factors, therefore, have been proposed to facilitate the evolution of cooperation between species and Sachs et al. (2004) recently proposed a useful verbal classification of some of the ideas. However, the theory is characterized by studies that focus upon one or a few factors in isolation and the formal relationship between the major ideas is unclear. For example, what is the relationship between the partner-fidelity feedback and the evolution of genetic correlations among species? How general are the effects of within-species relatedness? And how does byproduct mutualism interact with other mechanisms of mutualism evolution? As such, we lack a general theory of mutualism (Herre et al., 1999; West et al., 2002a; Bergstrom et al., 2003; Sachs et al., 2004) . Here we present a simple model that captures the key processes in mutualism evolution with the aim of uniting the existing ideas in a single framework. The result identifies three major factors important in the evolution of mutualisms: (i) benefit to cost ratio, (ii) within-species relatedness and (iii) between-species fidelity, which operate through three distinct feedback mechanisms: cooperator association, partner-fidelity feedback and partner choice. In defining the relationship between these processes, our model also allows their relative importance in mutualism evolution to be assessed. Importantly, the model suggests that phenotypic feedbacks (partner-fidelity feedback, partner choice) will typically be more important in between-species cooperation than the genetic correlations (cooperator association) that have been emphasized by previous theory (Frank, 1994; Doebeli & Knowlton, 1998; Yamamura et al., 2004) .
The model
We consider two species, A and B, which can increase each other's fitness (Fig. 1 ), e.g. microbe species in a biofilm that exchange compounds to mutual advantage (Kuhl et al., 1996) or a cleaner fish that removes parasites from a client fish that allows the cleaner to leave its mouth unharmed (Grutter, 1999; Bshary & Grutter, 2002) . We adopt a general approach because we are interested in the factors common to all mutualisms. General models can be criticized for removing much of the complexity of biological systems but their value lies in highlighting the fundamental processes of evolution (Hamilton, 1964; Frank, 1998; West et al., 2002a; West & Buckling, 2003; Foster, 2004) . Our goal is to develop a framework that identifies the key processes and forms a basis to compare the huge diversity of mutualisms. We follow a direct fitness perspective that captures the fitness effects of a social action through its effects on a focal individual, which can also be used to derive Hamilton's rule (Appendix; Frank, 1998) . We derive the model for an interaction between a group of each species, which we illustrate with a biofilm in which blue-green algae (cyanobacteria) release organic carbon and oxygen that benefits bacteria, which in return provide the algae with inorganic carbon (Kuhl et al., 1996) . This includes an interaction between individuals (e.g. client and cleaner fish) as a special case. As with most evolutionary models of mutualism (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Frank, 1994; Doebeli & Knowlton, 1998; Yamamura et al., 2004) , the analysis is phrased as a two-species interaction but the general conclusions do not rely upon this assumption and the framework is extendable to additional species. We capture the effects of mutualistic behaviour by a focal individual of species A on its own fitness (w Aij ) with five terms (Fig. 1a 
where a simple illustrative form of this equation is:
and a ij is the aid provided by the jth individual of species A that benefits species B in the ith group, e.g. the amount of energy that a focal alga cell (species A) invests in organic carbon that benefits the bacteria (species B). The weighting term x determines the benefit to species A of receiving aid from species B. For example, x will be large if a small amount of inorganic carbon greatly benefits species A algae. We consider three properties of species B that may be affected by mutualism in species A. First is b i , which is the genetically determined level of return aid by species B in the group e.g. inorganic carbon release in the bacteria group. We also consider two possible phenotypic effects of species A mutualism on species B. If mutualism by the algae increases the numbers, resources or survival of the bacteria in the group, this may increase the level of returned inorganic carbon. The effect of such a 'passive' phenotypic response in the bacteria on the aid they return is accounted for by p i . Second, we consider a coercive adaptation of species B to favour more cooperative members of species A (q i ), e.g. a behavioural response by the bacteria to the level of organic carbon provided by the algae, such as association with those alga that produce more carbon (sanctions or partner choice, Bull & Rice, 1991; Noe & Hammerstein, 1994; West et al., 2002a; Kiers et al., 2003; Sachs et al., 2004) . We focus on the evolution of cooperative traits here and do not track the evolution of such partner choice itself. However, other models suggest that partner choice and sanctioning will often be selected (West et al., 2002a) because it enables a mutualist to avoid exploitative cheaters in a partner species. We investigate when an increase in mutualistic aid by the focal individual of species A is favoured (Frank, 1998) . There is an equivalent equation for species B, which we later consider in the interaction between the two species (Fig. 2) . If g Aij is the genotype (or breeding value, Frank, 1998 ) that determines investment in mutualistic aid and w Aij the fitness of a focal individual of species A (eqn 1), then mutualistic aid is favoured when dw Aij /dg Aij is positive (Appendix; Price, 1970 Price, , 1972 Frank, 1998) . This simply says that increased organic carbon release is selected for when algal genotypes with increased release have increased fitness. Differentiating eqn 1a using the chain rule gives:
This partitions the relationship between fitness and mutual aid genotype (dw Aij /dg Aij ) into a sum of five terms, which are functions of a ij , x, b i , p i and q i respectively. Each term includes a partial differential and a full differential. The partial differentials capture the effect of each factor upon the focal individual's fitness (w Aij ) in the absence of other effects, which correspond to costs and benefits (Appendix, eqn 3 below).
The full differentials describe the effect of the focal individual's genotype (g Aij ) on the five terms of interest. We assume a direct correspondence between the genotype and phenotype of the focal individual so that da ij / dg Aij ¼ 1 (Frank, 1998) , and that the weighting term x is a constant so dx/dg Aij ¼ 0 and the terms containing x drop out. The last three full differentials capture the potential feedback effects of species B (db i /dg Aij , dp i /dg Aij , dq i /dg Aij ), which we term F b , F p , F q . Substituting back into eqn 2, this gives:
where, in our example, C is the personal cost to the algae of releasing organic carbon, B b , B p and B q assess the benefits to the algae from the evolved cooperativity (b i ), Mean evolved cooperation in species B group p i
Passive phenotypic response of species B to species A cooperation q i
Behavioural response of species B to species A cooperation, e.g. partner choice
Benefit of mutualism from evolved cooperativity (b i ), passive phenotypic response (p i ) and behavioural response (q i ) in partner species.
Degree of feedback effect from evolved cooperativity, passive phenotypic response and behavioural response in partner species r b , r p , r q
Relatedness among species A individuals at the spatial scale at which the feedbacks
Maximum potential effect of mutualism in species A upon evolved cooperativity, passive phenotypic response and behavioural response in partner species
Fidelity between species A and B in group over time relative to the rate that the feedbacks F b , F p , F q function passive phenotypic (p i ) or behavioural response (q i ) of the bacteria, and F b , F p and F q capture the extent to which benefits from these effects feedback upon the focal alga. As for Hamilton's rule (Hamilton, 1964; Price, 1970 Price, , 1972 Frank, 1998; Appendix) , selection favours the focal trait (carbon release) when dw Aij /dg Aij > 0, and mutualistic aid is predicted to evolve when:
Feedback effects
The degree to which mutualistic benefits feedback upon the focal individual is captured by F b , F p and F q . We expand these to capture three processes that determine the degree of each feedback, taking feedback from the cooperation genotype of species B (F b ) as an example (Fig. 1b) :
This breaks F b into three processes: (i) Within-species relatedness (da bi /dg Aij ¼ r b ; Frank, 1998; Pepper, 2000; Foster, 2004) : the association between focal individual's genotype (g Aij ) and group phenotype for cooperation (a bi ; within-group relatedness, Appendix). The subscript b in r b and a bi allows for feedback benefits (F b , F p , F q ) that return at different spatial scales. For example, the mutualistic benefit of changing species B genotype might be diffuse and shared by all species A in the population giving r b ¼ 0 (relatedness to population) whereas the benefit from altering species B phenotype may feedback on the focal A individual alone giving r q ¼ 1 (relatedness to self).
the maximum effect of a change in the level of aid by species A in the group (a i ) on the level of aid provided by species B (b¢ i ). The simplest case is that a change in species A causes a proportional change in species B and so e b ¼ 1.
The fidelity term defines whether the two species stay associated for long enough for potential benefits (b¢ i ) to feedback as actual benefits (b i ) and increase the focal individual's fitness. Fidelity captures any dilution of the feedback benefit over time, whereas relatedness captures any dilution over space. In a clonal group, fidelity corresponds to the proportion of the feedback effect that returns to the acting genotype. This will decrease if members of either species leave the group in the time it takes the feedback benefit to Table 1 , with the addition of subscripts A and B to denote effects from the perspective of each of the two species A and B. (a) Mutualism promoted by all parameters (r A ¼ r B ¼ 1, Frank, 1998; Foster, 2004) , which are plotted in phase plots as a function of evolved cooperativity in each species, a and b (Fig. 2) . The solution assumes gradual evolution with small changes in investment in mutualism (a ij , b ij ; Frank, 1998) and that individuals of a species at any moment have near-identical phenotypes:
Note that this makes the effects of cooperator association, which acts through variation within species, approximations only. Finally, we exploit the fact that the passive phenotypic feedback from a partner species (p A , p B ) is a function of the mutualistic investment of a focal species (a, b) i.e. p A ¼ g(a) and p B ¼ h(b) and take the simplest case of a direct correspondence between investment and the effect on the other species: Consistent with the predictions of the general model (eqn 5), the analysis predicts that mutualism will evolve when relatedness and fidelity are sufficient for feedback benefits through either cooperator association or partner fidelity to occur. Modelling both species together also highlights the interaction between the two species' levels of mutualism. That is, a critical level of mutualistic aid must be provided by one partner before mutualism can evolve in the other. This is consistent with the intuitive idea that selection will not favour investment in a partner species that provides little or no return aid. Related to this, the model shows that low feedback benefits to mutualism in any one species is sufficient to prevent mutualism because as one provides less aid, the other is also favoured to be more selfish (Fig. 2d ).
Discussion
The model predicts that three key factors will be important in the evolution of mutualism: costs to benefit ratio, relatedness, and fidelity, which function by moderating the importance of three feedback benefits (below, Fig. 3 ). Most fundamentally, mutualism is favoured when the cost are low relative to the benefits, as in Hamilton's rule (Appendix). This can result from the basic ecology of a mutualism but, interestingly, may also occur due to coercive adaptations in the partner species that restrict the potential for cheating (Yu et al., 2004) . Costs and benefits are also central to the suggestion that cooperation often evolves between species through 'byproduct mutualism', where a trait evolves in one species for purely selfish reasons that happens to benefit another species (West-Eberhard, 1975; Brown, 1983; Connor, 1986 Connor, , 1995 Sachs et al., 2004) . A hypothetical example from Connor (1986) is a plant in a hot environment whose leaves happen to shade a bird's nest and keeps it cool.
The benefit and cost terms in eqn 3 formally define byproduct mutualism: the cost of the trait (growing leaves) on individual fitness C is negative (i.e. it has a benefit), and there are no benefits through aid provided to the other species (B b ¼ B p ¼ B q ¼ 0). Equation 3 also makes it clear that traits can evolve for a combination of byproduct benefits and feedbacks from the partner species when some benefit terms (B b , B p , B q ) are positive in addition to C being negative, e.g. the plant may be selected to grow more foliage in the bird's presence than in its absence if the bird provides some return benefit. This shows that byproduct benefits are not a discrete category of mutualism but can exist alongside the other feedback mechanisms, such as partner fidelity or partner choice (below). Interestingly, this nonexclusivity of byproduct effects is analogous to the argument that individual and group selection are not mutually exclusive but rather positive selection can occur at both levels, where again the relative importance of the two selective forces can be assessed by partial differentials (Goodnight et al., 1992) .
As in the analyses of Frank (1994) and West et al. (2002b) , our model predicts that within-species relatedness in groups will promote among-species cooperation.
More generally, our model shows that relatedness is essential for all feedback benefits (Fig. 3) , and, unless there are byproduct effects, a group will only provide mutual aid to another species if there is positive relatedness in the group. It is important to note, however, that relatedness in our model is 'within-group' relatedness: the regression of group phenotype on individual genotype (Appendix). This encompasses both the effect of pairwise relatedness among group member (e.g. if they are kin) and the direct effect of the focal individual on the group phenotype. The latter is important when groups are small because each individual can directly influence group phenotype and a significant proportion of mutualistic investments will feedback upon the actor (1/n, where n is group size). This effect generates within-group relatedness that can select for mutualism without pairwise relatedness ('weak altruism', Wilson, 1990; Foster et al., 2006) . To take the extreme case, mutualistic aid can return to a single individual, such as when the bobtail squid, Euprymna scolopes, directs nutrients to the bioluminescent bacteria, Vibrio fisheri, that live in its light organ (Visick et al., 2000; Sachs et al., 2004) . Here, investments only benefit the focal squid and relatedness to the 'group' that benefits from the mutualism is simply the relatedness of the squid to itself i.e. r ap ¼ 1. By contrast, in a large group of unrelated individuals, the focal individual carries the cost of providing aid to the other species but nonrelatives share the benefits, which prevents mutualism and is an example of the evolutionary 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin, 1968; Leigh, 1977; Frank, 1998; Michod, 1999; Foster, 2004; Wenseleers et al., 2004) . Relatedness in our model also captures the effect of multiple species on one side (or guild) of a mutualism (Stanton, 2003) , where increasing species in a guild will have the same effect as reducing within-species relatedness.
High fidelity between the members of each species promotes the evolution of mutualism. Investment in a partner species will only be selected if species stay together long enough for feedbacks to benefit those that caused them. This is consistent with several models that have emphasized the importance of spatial structure and population viscosity, which function to keep members of the two species together over time (Frank, 1994; Doebeli & Knowlton, 1998; Yamamura et al., 2004) . Both fidelity and relatedness need to be positive for a feedback to provide a benefit to a mutualist. Furthermore, the model predicts that the levels of fidelity and relatedness associated with a particular feedback benefit (Fig. 3) will be central to whether it selects for mutualism. We now discuss each of the feedback benefits in turn.
Cooperator association
Mutualism will be promoted when cooperation by a species A individual (a ij ) increases the evolved level of cooperation in species B (b i ). That is, when the genotypes at the locus for cooperation correlate across the two species (cooperator association; Fig. 3a ). This effect was Cooperator association -cooperative genotypes of one species (white smiling faces) tend to occur with cooperative genotypes of the other species (grey smiling faces). The figure shows one way this association may be generated (Yamamura et al., 2004) : when cooperation in one species (white) provides large benefits and compensates for the cost of cooperation by the other (grey), which better allows cooperative genotypes to persist. Other ways cooperator association may occur are discussed in the text. (b) Partnerfidelity feedback -when cooperation by one species (white) has a positive phenotypic effect on the other species (e.g. abundance, survival, growth, reproduction) that provides a feedback benefit. (c) Partner choice -an active behavioural response in one species (grey) that favours cooperation in the other. Three mechanisms are shown (i) No association -choosing species interacts more with cooperators in the other species, e.g. client's choosing cleaner fish.
(ii) Rejection -choosing species interacts randomly but rejects noncooperators, e.g. yuccas dropping fruit with many moth eggs. (iii) Sanctions -choosing species interacts randomly but supplies less aid to noncooperators, e.g. legumes regulating nutrients to rhizobia. described by Frank (1994) and the term F b ¼ f b e b r b in eqn 3 corresponds to his 'between-species relatedness' (r j s i in Frank, 1994) . Frank showed that local selection can generate this correlation whenever mutualist genotypes tend to stay together across generations. Such local selection was also central to the evolution of mutualism in the spatial simulations of Doebeli & Knowlton (1998) and Yamamura et al. (2004) (see Fig. 3b in the latter paper). In the simulations, local pockets of mutualism formed between the two species where mutualistic genotypes in species A favoured mutualistic genotypes in the other species (e b > 0), and spatial structure meant that the species A genotypes could benefit in the next generation from the local increase in species B cooperation (f b > 0, r b > 0) (see also Wilkinson & Sherratt, 2001) . Hypothetically, cooperator association might also occur through a phenotype-matching mechanism analogous to the 'greenbeard' mechanism for within-species cooperation (Hamilton, 1964; Dawkins, 1976) or if more cooperative individuals of each species tend to occur in the same environment.
Examples: little is known empirically about cooperator association. A first step is to quantify natural genetic variation in the levels of mutualism, which is required for cooperator association to occur. Evidence for this variation comes from mutualisms with 'cheater' individuals, including yucca plants that do not sustain yucca moth larvae in their fruits (Bao & Addicott, 1998) , some nectarless plants in populations of honey mesquite (Golubov et al., 1999) , nonfixing strains of rhizobial bacteria of legumes (Thrall et al., 2000) and strains of the symbiotic algae of the upside-down jellyfish that invest little in their host (Sachs and Wilcox, 2006) . However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence as yet that the genetic component of this variation correlates among mutualist species.
Partner-fidelity feedback
Mutualism is favoured by positive effects upon the phenotype of the partner species, such as its abundance or survival, which provide feedback benefits to the mutualist. Like cooperator association, this effect is promoted by group fidelity (f p > 0). That is, spatial structure and low group turnover relative to the rate of feedback benefits. As a result, such effects have been termed 'partner-fidelity feedback' (Bull & Rice, 1991; Sachs et al., 2004) , although fidelity is important for all of the feedbacks (above). Our model shows it is important to distinguish partner-fidelity feedback from cooperator association. Cooperator association occurs when increased mutualism affects the genetics of the partner species and selects for more cooperative genotypes (Fig. 3a) , whereas partner-fidelity feedback is purely phenotypic (Fig. 3b) .
Partner-fidelity feedback is present in some models (Frank, 1994; Doebeli & Knowlton, 1998 ) but cooperator association is often emphasized (Doebeli & Knowlton, 1998; Wilkinson & Sherratt, 2001; Yamamura et al., 2004) . In contrast, our model suggests that partnerfidelity feedback will typically be more important than cooperator association, because fidelity values are likely to be much higher for the former (f p > f b ). Phenotypic effects can be much more rapid than genetic changes and, particularly, do not require that species associate across generations. Furthermore, although the effects of mutualism upon a partner's phenotype can potentially be very great (0 £ e p < ¥), cooperator association can at best cause an equivalent response in the partner species (0 £ e b £ 1).
Examples: Partner-fidelity feedback was shown by Agrawal & Karban (1997) who by adding leaf domatia to cotton plants, were able to increase the number of predatory arthropods that protect the plant from herbivores, which increased fruit production (Agrawal & Karban, 1997) . Such abundance benefits to a host are likely whenever a symbiont lives on or in a partner species (Fig. 3b) , including examples such as the gut flora of animals (Frank, 1996a; Backhed et al., 2005) , rhizobia and mycorrhiza on or in the roots of plants (Strack et al., 2003) , and the fluorescent bacteria Vibrio fischeri that live in the bobtail squid (Visick et al., 2000) . Feedback benefits from increasing partner abundance will also be important in multispecies biofilms (Stoodley et al., 2002) , including the blue-green algae and bacterial example discussed above (Kuhl et al., 1996) , and dental biofilms where some species of bacteria require each other to colonize the surface of a tooth (Palmer et al., 2001) . Switching to the symbiont perspective, symbionts can benefit from partner-fidelity feedback when mutualism improves the growth and survival of their hosts, e.g. V. fischeri bacteria will benefit from keeping their squid host alive (Visick et al., 2000) .
Strong selection for mutualism will result when there is a feedback benefit from a partner species' reproduction, because this can align the fitness interests of the two partners. This feedback occurs in vertically transmitted symbionts including the garden fungi of leafcutter ants (Mueller, 2002) , and termites (Korb & Aanen, 2003) whose reproduction is limited by dispersing sexuals in some species; viruses carried by some parasitoid wasps that inactivate the immune system of the wasp's caterpillar host (Whitfield, 2002) ; and the transport of scale insects by dispersing ant gynes to a new plant, where upon arrival the scale insects will provide the ants with honeydew in return for protection (Gullan & Kosztarab, 1997) .
Partner choice and sanctions
Mutualism will be favoured if one species actively increases the return benefits to more mutualistic members of the other species. Several behaviours can cause this effect, including interacting more with cooperators in the other species, interacting randomly but later rejecting noncooperators and interacting randomly but sanctioning or punishing noncooperators ( Fig. 3c ; Bull & Rice, 1991; Noe & Hammerstein, 1994; Johnstone & Bshary, 2002; West et al., 2002a; Kiers et al., 2003; Sachs et al., 2004) . All these mechanisms result in increased benefits being provided to the more cooperative members of the other species (F q > 0). Our model predicts that partner choice mechanisms will select strongly for mutualism. For example, if pollinators avoid plants with low nectar then this will be a strong, rapid and relatively local effect (partner choice: high f q , r q ) compared to the negative effect of low nectar on pollinator population size, which is likely to be weaker, delayed and affect many more plants (partner-fidelity feedback: low f p , r p ). This said, partner choice is typically only found in one of the species in mutualisms (Sachs et al., 2004) and, therefore, cannot explain the mutualism in the choosing species itself.
Examples: Consistent with the prediction that partner choice is a highly effective way to promote mutualism, there is growing evidence for partner choice in many mutualisms. A nice example comes from some yucca species (Pellmyr & Huth, 1994; Marr & Pellmyr, 2003) and the Senita cactus (Holland et al., 2004) that abort fruit containing too many eggs of their pollinating moths. Yuccas also create 'damage zones' around eggs that inflict disproportionate harm when many eggs are laid in a fruit (Addicott & Bao, 1999; Shapiro & Addicott, 2003) . Other plants with partner choice include some ant plants, where the domatia for the ants only develop properly if the plant's leaves are protected (Yu, 2001) , and legumes that direct more resources to root nodules containing cooperative rhizobial bacteria (Kiers et al., 2003) . Partner choice has also been found in the leaf cutter ant and fungus mutualism where ants act to remove parasitic and foreign fungi (Currie & Stuart, 2001; Mueller et al., 2004; Poulsen & Boomsma, 2005) ; in client fish that return to cleaner fish that provide the best service (Bshary & Grutter, 2002; Bshary & Schaffer, 2002) or leave cleaner fish that bite them (Johnstone & Bshary, 2002) ; in ants that preferentially attend aphids and lycaenid caterpillars that produce the sweetest honeydew (Volkl et al., 1999; Agrawal & Fordyce, 2000; Mailleux et al., 2003) ; in the bobtail squid that poisons nonfluorescent bacteria in its light organ (Visick et al., 2000) ; in frugivores that only ingest and disperse the seeds of plants that provide nutritious fruit (Howe & Smallwood, 1982) and in pollinators that reject plants with low nectar (Smithson & Gigord, 2003 ).
Conclusions
The model shows that mutualism will evolve when costs are low relative to feedback benefits (Fig. 3) . In addition, it predicts that those feedbacks benefits which are associated with high within-species relatedness and between-species fidelity will be most important in mutualism evolution. This suggests that partner choice, which can act locally (high relatedness) and quickly (high fidelity), will provide a powerful incentive for mutualism. In addition, the relative rapidity with which partner-fidelity feedback can operate suggests that it too will often be important. In contrast, the development of genetic associations among species (cooperator association) is predicted to be the least important feedback, because of the likely requirement that mutualists associate across generations. Consistent with these predictions, there is good empirical evidence for the role of partner-fidelity feedback and partner choice whereas the present role of cooperator association is much less clear, although it is important in several models (Frank, 1994; Doebeli & Knowlton, 1998; Yamamura et al., 2004) . It is also the case that cooperator association has received less attention empirically and dedicated studies are now desirable. In addition, there is a broad scope for interesting studies into the role of within-species relatedness, which is a central factor in within species cooperation but has been little studied in mutualisms (one notable exception is the fig wasps (Frank, 1985; Herre, 1985) .
Our model does not capture many of the interesting details and idiosyncrasies of individual mutualisms, and there is a broad scope for more specific analyses (e.g. West et al., 2002b) . The utility of our model we hope lies in the ability to capture the key processes in a single model and facilitate comparisons across the huge diversity of mutualisms. That said, there are some processes that we did not consider. Firstly, our analysis is phrased in terms of two interacting species although many mutualisms, such as any pollinators and plants, occur between two guilds each containing multiple species, where each guild will often contain both mutualist and 'cheater' species (Ferriere et al., 2002; Bronstein, 2003; Wilson et al., 2003) . The conclusions of our model certainly apply to such systems but we recognize that explicit models of such multiple species guilds may reveal additional factors important in mutualism evolution. Our model also focused upon the origin and evolution of mutualistic traits (gene or individual-level selection) rather than the ecological stability of the resulting mutualism, which is the question of whether species with particular traits would persist over evolutionary time (species-level selection, e.g. Wilson et al., 2003) . Combining these two forms of selection remains a challenge for the future but the general prediction is that species-level selection will favour mutualisms with properties that prevent the evolution of cheaters, such as pleiotropic links between potential cheating strategies and a personal cost .
The evolution of cooperation within species has been intensely studied (Hamilton, 1964; Wilson, 1975; Maynard Smith & Szathmáry, 1995; Frank, 1998 Frank, , 2003 Foster, 2004; Sachs et al., 2004) . Our model shows that, although undoubtedly more complex, the evolution of mutualisms is amenable to the same kinds of analysis, and similar factors are important for within and between-species cooperation (costs and benefits, relatedness, fidelity). Importantly, the model suggests that mutualism can often provide selfish benefits and helps to explain the puzzle of cooperation between species.
